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Non-technical summary
• A simple model is presented where states decide on, and finance, universities
which are attended by local but also by non-resident, mobile students.
• The efficient allocation is characterised. By means of an example, it is shown
that efficiency may require to concentrate mobile students in a small number
of “elite” universities.
• Un-coordinated decisions by the states are shown to satisfy the same first
order conditions as the efficient allocation provided that the universities have
the right to charge a tuition fee reflecting the costs induced by an additional
student.
• If tuition is banned or capped by the federal government, inefficient quality
choices and insufficient admission numbers are likely to emerge.
• The analysis supports the assignment of responsibility for higher education
to the La¨nder in the German federation. The right of the La¨nder to run
universities should, however, be complemented by an unconstrained right to
decide on tuition fees.
Public Universities, Tuition and Competition –
A Tiebout Model
by Robert Schwager
Georg-August-University Go¨ttingen and
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim
September 2007
Abstract. A simple Tiebout model is presented where states provide university
education to both immobile and mobile students. State governments choose the
quality of public universities by trading off the value of education for the local
immobile student population and the costs, net of tuition revenues, of running the
university. The quality of education and the assignment of students to universities
in an efficient allocation are characterised. It is shown that decentralised decisions
result in efficient choices if states are allowed to choose tuition levels freely. If tuition
is capped, inefficiently low qualities are likely to arise.
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A. Introduction
In recent years, the assignment of responsibilities for higher education between the
German states (La¨nder) and the federation (Bund) has undergone several changes.
This development started when the constitutional court voided, in two rulings is-
sued in 2004 and 2005,1 two provisions amending the federal directive on universities
(Hochschulrahmengesetz). The first of these provisions regulated the structure of
personnel at state universities, and the second one stipulated that tuition fees are
illegal. In both cases, the court ruled that the federation had no jurisdiction over the
matter concerned, and hence strengthened the role of the states in higher education.
In 2006, both chambers of parliament voted in favour of a set of changes to the verti-
cal assignment of functions in the German federation.2 Included in this package was
a decision to abolish the 50% matching grant so far provided by the federation to
state investment in university buildings.3 In the same time, the states were granted
more autonomy in running universities, a movement which meanwhile has culmi-
nated in a plan by the federal government to abolish the Hochschulrahmengesetz
altogether.4
These developments have not been greeted with unequivocal welcome. Specifically,
it is feared that un-coordinated competition in higher education leads to insufficient
funding of universities. This opinion is based on a fiscal externality arising from the
mobility of students across states. When a state government designs its universities,
it will weigh the cost of education, paid out of the state budget, against the benefit
procured by the university to the population of that state. This trade-off, however,
does not include the benefits accruing to students who enter the state’s universities
but originate from other states. A state government which is responsible to the
local electorate will disregard these benefits and hence, from a social point of view,
will spend too little on universities. Similarly, the incentives to invest in higher
education are reduced if part of the native high school graduates attend universities
in other states. Bu¨ttner and Schwager (2004) provide empirical evidence showing
that this fiscal externality is operating in the German federation. Using data on state
expenditures for higher education, they find that a state spends less on universities
if the neighboring states spend a lot. Thus, it seems that states whose high-school
1BVerfG, 2 BvF 2/02 vom 27.7.2004 and 2 BvF 1/03 vom 26.1.2005.
2This motion has become known as Fo¨deralismusreform I. The laws enacting the reform are
Gesetz zur A¨nderung des Grundgesetzes vom 28. August 2006, BGBl 2006, Teil I, Nr. 41, S. 2034,
and Fo¨deralismusreform-Begleitgesetz vom 5. September 2006, BGBl 2006, Teil I, Nr. 41, S. 2098.
3Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Hochschulbau, Art. 91a Abs. 1 Nr.1 GG a.F.; see BMF (2006), p. 87.
4See BMBF (2007).
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graduates can easily move or even commute to universities in other states drive down
their own expenditures for higher education.
The objective of the present contribution is to put this empirical evidence, and
the underlying fiscal externality argument, into a theoretical perspective. For this
purpose, a standard fiscal competition model is presented. In this model, universities
are run and paid for by sub-national governments out of tax revenues raised locally.
There are both immobile and mobile students. Since state governments take only
the interests of native students and taxpayers into account, neglecting the benefit of
immigrant students, one might expect that the above mentioned under-provision of
university education results. This is not the case, however, if universities have the
right to raise tuition fees at a level which is at their discretion. It is shown that when
this instrument is available, the willingness to pay for education by non-resident
students is completely internalised in the state budget, and that by consequence,
the Tiebout equilibrium is efficient.
A fiscal externality re-emerges, however, if the states do not have the right to choose
the tuition level. If the federal government bans tuition, as was the case in the former
Hochschulrahmengesetz, or more generally, fixes tuition fees at any arbitrary level,
the states’ decisions on the quality of higher education are distorted. If tuition is
capped at a low level, it is likely that the quality of universities deteriorates, and that
an insufficient number of students is admitted. The upshot of this analysis is that
un-coordinated sub-national policies in higher education are not, by their nature,
inefficient. Rather, any inefficiencies arise from an insufficient set of instruments
in the hands of the states. In particular, the right to set tuition levels should
complement the right to run universities.
The model presented here is rooted in the traditional theory of local public eco-
nomics, pioneered by Tiebout (1956), and its non-spatial counterpart, the theory
of clubs initiated by Buchanan (1965). Most previous applications of this approach
in the field of education focus on primary or secondary education, rather than on
universities like the present work. Correspondingly, in such models it is typically
assumed that parents either move together with their children so as to enjoy a good
public school financed out of local property taxes (for example, Miceli, 1993, and
Nechyba, 1999), or that they pay tuition to a private profit maximising institution
(for example, Epple and Romano, 1998). While this kind of work is motivated
by US or British institutions, Bu¨ttner and Schwager (2004) and Kemnitz (2005)
present models which are more closely tailored to the German system of financing
higher education through state budgets. In Bu¨ttner and Schwager (2004), two states
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choose the qualities of their universities in the presence of student mobility, creating
the fiscal externality described above. In this setup, the introduction of exogenous,
small tuition fees is shown to locally improve the allocation. Since no decentralised
tuition choice is modelled, however, it remains open in that paper to what extent
tuition fees can restore efficiency.
Similar to the result presented here, Kemnitz (2005) shows that tuition fees improve
educational quality when states are responsible for universities. Beyond several
modelling details, the work by Kemnitz (2005) and the present paper mainly differ
in the way the interest of native students is taken into account in the objective
function of state governments. In Kemnitz’s model, the earnings of these students
are valued by state policy makers only insofar as they raise the state’s tax revenues.
Contrary to that, in the present model, native students’ utilities enter the local
objective function with the same weight as those of the taxpayers. Thus, the present
paper pursues a more traditional welfare-economic approach, where the benefit of
everyone in society counts, whereas the objective function in Kemnitz (2005) is
rather motivated by public choice considerations, valuing only the interests of the
majority of voters. It is remarkable, and strengthens the case for tuition fees in
the context of decentralised education policies, that these two approaches reach a
similar conclusion.
The present paper, and the work cited so far, deals with mobile incoming students.
Another strand of literature considers students who attend university in their home
region but move after graduation. Such mobility prevents states from recovering,
through taxation of education-enhanced earnings, the public expenditures invested
in their native students. In such a setting, as shown by Wildasin (2000), decen-
tralised public provision of higher education is inefficient. Moreover, the structure
of higher education is biased in favour of skills, such as legal studies, which are
not internationally applicable (see Poutvaara, 2004, 2005). While this is clearly an
interesting and relevant fiscal interaction, it is chiefly brought about by the fiscal
competition for mobile (here, human) capital. In order to focus on the fiscal ex-
ternality created by providing costly education to non-residents, this kind of fiscal
competition is not considered in the present paper.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section B, the model set-up is
described. In section C, efficient allocations are characterised and illustrated by
a numerical example. Decentralised policies are analysed in section D. There, the
central result identifying Tiebout equilibria and efficient allocations is presented.
Moreover, the impact of federally mandated tuition levels is examined and possible
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alternatives to tuition fees are discussed. The concluding section E discusses the
implications of the results for higher education policy and the federal structure in
Germany.
B. The model
The model describes a federation consisting of J jurisdictions, called states, which
are labelled j = 1, 2, ..., J . Each state provides tertiary education in a system of
public universities. Individual universities are not modelled as separate actors. This
is motivated by the fact that, in spite of a certain autonomy granted to public uni-
versities, these institutions are still largely under the control of state governments.
In the following, the university system is consequently described, and referred to, as
consisting of one university in each state. The university in state j provides educa-
tion at a quality qj ≥ 0. This variable captures all aspects of the university which
are relevant for educational success, measured by the job prospects of graduates.
For example, major determinants of quality may be the qualification of the faculty
as researchers and teachers, the availability of books and computing facilities, the
office hour time a teacher accords to each student, etc.
In state j, there are `j > 0 immobile, “local”, students. They study in their home
state and receive a wage w`(qj) which depends on the quality of the education
received. In addition, there are M > 0 mobile students in the federation who can
choose where to study. A mobile student who obtains her education in state j
will earn a wage of wm(qj). Both functions w` and wm are increasing in quality,
w′` > 0, w
′
m > 0, and concave, w
′′
` ≤ 0, w′′m ≤ 0.5
The fact that the wage functions w` and wm may differ means that the two groups
of students are not only differentiated by their readiness to leave home, but also by
characteristics relating to the educational success, such as academic ability or moti-
vation. For example, mobile students may be more able academically than immobile
students, so that they benefit more from whatever education is given to them. This
may correspond to a society where it is the brightest or most energetic students
who migrate, possibly because being confined to their home state would limit their
5This formulation ignores any consumption utility derived from studying at specific locations.
While clearly, such considerations are relevant for many students (see Fabel et al., 2002), at least
some mobile students seem to care about the academic quality of the university they attend (see
Bu¨ttner et al., 2003). One could integrate such location specific attractions without altering the
basic logic of the argument, for example by adding a state-specific leisure term to the wage function
wm(qj).
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intellectual and professional opportunities. In the converse case, where mobile stu-
dents obtain a lower wage than local ones, mobility is related to a relatively inferior
ability to take advantage of education. This might describe a student population
who move away from home for lifestyle rather than academic reasons, such as to get
away from the surveillance of parents, or to enjoy the attractions of big cities.
The cost of providing higher education in state j depends on the quality qj which
is supplied, and the number of students enrolled at the state’s university. Total
enrolment consists of the `j local students together with mj mobile students who
study in state j. The cost function in state j is given by cj(qj, `j + mj). It is
assumed to be convex, with first derivatives cjq > 0, c
j
m > 0 and second derivatives
cjqq > 0, c
j
mm > 0, and c
j
qm ≥ 0. This cost function describes how much money has to
be spent in state j if an education of quality qj is to be provided to `j+mj students.
Naturally, costs increase in the quality of education. Moreover, costs also rise when
more students are to be educated. Thus, the cost function displays crowding costs,
as is common in Tiebout or club good models. In the context of a university, crowd-
ing costs arise when an increase in enrolment either directly induces a rise in public
expenditures for the university, or indirectly makes additional costs necessary so
as to maintain the quality. An example for the first case might be the costs for
additional copies of teaching material which have to be provided to each student.
An example for the second case is provided by the common experience of a class-
room which becomes so crowded that it is difficult to follow the presentation of
the instructor. The formulation used here implies that once quality is chosen, the
government compensates any quality decline triggered in this way by an increase in
the number of students. Thus, when classrooms are about to become overcrowded,
the government will provide for new space and/or hire additional instructors so as
to maintain the desired quality.
Mobile students obtain a utility uo if they do not study at all. Since in a decentralised
setting, states may choose not to admit any mobile students, this is a relevant case,
as will be seen in subsection D.II. In contrast, a no-study-option is not explicitly
considered for the immobile students. Rather, its is assumed that in each state j =
1, 2, ..., J , there is some (potentially small) quality level qj such that the aggregate
net value of providing higher education to the local students, `jw`(qj) − cj(qj, `j),
is larger than their aggregate utility if they do not study. This essentially says that
everywhere, at least some young people are able enough so that providing higher
education to them is the best choice for society.6
6By this assumption, one avoids having to deal with the case where it is efficient for some state
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The model is closed by introducing a third group of individuals who are immobile,
do not study, and have to pay, through their taxes, for the higher education pro-
vided in their home state. To use a convenient label, these agents are called the
“parents”. This group represents all agents in society who are not currently poten-
tial students. This includes both former students who now have reached working
age,7 and individuals who never study. Essentially, the role of the parents in the
model is to provide the resources necessary to finance universities. The endowment
of the parents in any state, although not explicitly modelled, is thus assumed to be,
in each of the various scenarios analysed in sections C and D, sufficiently large to
pay for the costs of higher education provided in this state.8
C. Efficient policies
I. First-order conditions
Aggregate welfare is expressed, in monetary units, by the sum of the payoffs accruing
to the three types of agents in all states. That is, welfareW is given by the difference
between the wages earned by immobile students and the wages or reservation utilities
enjoyed by mobile students, and the provision costs incurred in all states. A Pareto
efficient allocation is then characterised by the solution of the following optimisation
problem:9
max
(qj ,mj)j=1,...,J
W (q1, ..., qJ ,m1, ...,mJ) =
∑
j
`jw`(qj) +
∑
j
mjwm(qj)
+
(
M −∑
j
mj
)
uo −
∑
j
cj(qj, `j +mj) (1)
s.t. M −∑
j
mj ≥ 0 (2)
mj ≥ 0 for all j = 1, 2, ..., J (3)
The constraints (2) and (3) require that in aggregate, at most the total number of
mobile students can be enrolled somewhere, and that the number of mobile students
to close down its universities altogether – an outcome which is neither realistic nor interesting.
7With this interpretation, the present set-up can be considered to be a shortcut for an overlap-
ping generations model where young agents study and old agents pay taxes.
8The presence of immobile agents with “deep pockets” distinguishes the public university fea-
turing in the present model from a private institution. A private university, even if it is not for
profit, would have to break even, whereas any losses incurred by the public university can be
covered by taxing immobile resources.
9Here and in the following, summations are taken over all states j = 1, 2, ..., J .
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in each state is non-negative.
Associating the Lagrange variables λ to the constraint (2), and αj to the non-
negativity constraint (3) applying to state j, the necessary conditions10 for an effi-
cient allocation are, for j = 1, ..., J ,
∂L
∂qj
= `jw
′
`(qj) +mjw
′
m(qj)− cjq(qj, `j +mj) = 0, (4)
∂L
∂mj
= wm(qj)− uo − cjm(qj, `j +mj)− λ+ αj = 0, (5)
together with the appropriate complementary slackness conditions. From equality
(4) one derives the condition
`jw
′
`(qj) +mjw
′
m(qj) = c
j
q(qj, `j +mj) (6)
for an efficient quality qj. At an efficient allocation the aggregate marginal willing-
ness to pay for quality by all students enrolled in state j, local and mobile ones,
is equated to the marginal cost of quality. This condition, which is reminiscent of
the Samuelson condition for the efficient provision of a public good, illustrates the
club good nature of higher education. Students can be excluded from using the
university, so that only the willingness to pay of those who are admitted to state j’s
university is taken into account. Once admitted, however, all students benefit from
the same quality, and hence their willingness to pay has to be added.
For a state j which, in an efficient allocation, should admit a positive number mj of
mobile students, one has αj = 0. Thus, from (5), it follows
wm(qj)− uo − cjm(qj, `j +mj) = λ . (7)
Similarly, if the efficient allocation requires that some state does not admit any
mobile students, from αj ≥ 0, one has
wm(qj)− uo − cjm(qj, `j) ≤ λ, (8)
with a strict inequality except for the borderline case where the non-negativity
constraint (3) is just not binding. The left-hand sides in (7) and (8) give the net
social benefit from educating an additional mobile student in state j. This benefit
10It is well known that in club good, or Tiebout, economies where the number of users of a public
good is endogenous, standard convexity assumptions on preferences and technologies alone do not
guarantee that first-order conditions are sufficient for a maximum (see, for example, Starrett, 1988,
p. 77-83 and Schweizer, 1996). Since the present contribution is focussed upon the interpretation
of Tiebout economies in the field of higher education, it is not attempted here to deal with this
issue mathematically. Thus, only first-order conditions are considered.
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consists of the gain in wage procured to the student by studying in state j rather
than foregoing higher education, net of the marginal crowding cost inflicted by this
student on the taxpayer in state j. Thus, according to (7), in an efficient allocation
mobile students are allocated across space such that the net marginal benefit of
educating them is equalised across all universities which do admit mobiles students.
There may, however, be some universities which would provide a net benefit which is
below this amount; according to (8), these universities should not admit any mobile
students.
The level of the common net benefit λ = wm(qj)− uo− cjm(qj, `j +mj) of educating
mobile students is determined by their scarcity, measured by the shadow price λ.
If λ > 0, then
∑
j mj = M . Thus, if it pays socially to educate mobile students at
some university, then all students end up attending a university. Conversely, if some
students do not attend university,
∑
j mj < M , then for all students, the net benefit
of higher education drops to zero.
The efficient inter-regional distribution of higher education institutions can display
two qualitatively quite different patterns. On the one hand, mobile students might
be distributed more or less evenly across states, with the quality of education in
all states being similar, taking into account the interests of, and crowding costs
induced by, the mobile students. Alternatively, the efficient university system in the
federation may be very heterogeneous, with a few universities taking in all mobile
students, whereas the remaining institutions cater to a purely local audience. In
order to shed some light on the economic effects which cause one of these two
scenarios to prevail, in the following subsection a simple example is presented which
displays, for different parameter values, both kinds of solutions.
II. An example
In the example, there are two states, J = 2, which are symmetric. In both states
j = 1, 2 there is an equal number of local students `j = L/2, and the cost function
is the same and given by
cj(qj, `j +mj) = c
(
qj,
L
2
+mj
)
=
1
2
q2j +
k2
2
(
L
2
+mj
)2
. (9)
In this cost function, the parameter k ≥ 0 measures the importance of enrolment-
related crowding costs. As seen from the cross derivative cqm = 0, an increase in
the number of students has no impact on the marginal cost of quality. While clearly
special, this case has an interesting interpretation. As mentioned in section B,
10
quality of education is, among other things, also related to the scientific reputation
of the faculty teaching at the university. Now it seems plausible that the marginal
cost of enhancing reputation, say by hiring a star professor, is more or less the
same in large and in small universities. Thus, the separable cost function (9) fits
rather well the case where quality of education is mainly driven by the scientific
qualification of the faculty.
For immobile students, the marginal wage impact of a better education is normalised
to unity, so that w`(qj) = qj. Mobile students obtain a wage given by wm(qj) = wqj,
where w > 0 is a constant. Relating to the two types of mobile students discussed
in section B, w > 1 (w < 1) corresponds to a mobile student population which is
more able (less able) than the immobile students.
In the following, two allocations are compared, an integrated allocation (I) where
in each state, half of the mobile students are enrolled, and a segregated (S) one,
where all mobile students gather in one jurisdiction, say state 1.11 In the inte-
grated allocation, the condition (6) for the optimal quality qI in each state reads
(L/2)w′`(q
I) + (M/2)w′m(q
I) = cq(q
I , (L + M)/2). With w′` = 1, w
′
m = w and
cq(q) = q, this yields q
I = (L+Mw)/2. Inserting q1 = q2 = q
I , `1 = `2 = L/2, and
m1 = m2 =M/2 in (1), one finds
W I = L · w`(qI) +M · wm(qI)− 2c
(
qI ,
L+M
2
)
=
1
4
[
(L+Mw)2 − k2 (L+M)2
]
(10)
for the welfare reached in an integrated allocation.
In the segregated allocation, the quality in state 1, where all M mobile students are
enrolled, can be derived from the first order condition (L/2)w′`(q
S
1 ) +Mw
′
m(q
S
1 ) =
cq(q
S
1 , (L/2) +M), yielding q
S
1 = (L/2) +Mw. The quality in state 2, where only
local students are educated, follows from (L/2)w′`(q
S
2 ) = cq(q
S
2 , L/2), and hence is
qS2 = L/2. Using (1) again, the welfare
W S =
L
2
· w`(qS1 ) +M · wm(qS1 )− c
(
qS1 ,
L
2
+M
)
+
L
2
· w`(qS2 )− c
(
qS2 ,
L
2
)
=
1
8
[
(L+ 2Mw)2 − k2(L+ 2M)2 + (1− k2)L2
]
(11)
in the segregated allocation can be derived.
11For simplicity, in the example, the utility uo obtained by a mobile non-graduate is assumed to
be so low that in an efficient allocation, all mobile students attend a university.
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Comparing both welfare levels from (10) and (11), one finds that
W I ≥ W S if and only if k ≥ w . (12)
Thus, in the example, both kinds of university landscape discussed in the end of
subsection I can emerge as the efficient allocation, depending on the parameters k
and w. The integrated university system, where throughout the federation, univer-
sities cater to some mobile students and provide the same quality, is superior if (and
only if) crowding costs in teaching are important, i.e., k is high, and the mobile
students are not very able compared to the immobile students, i.e., w is low. Relat-
ing this result to the motivation for mobility discussed in section B, the integrated
university system seems to be specifically appropriate if student mobility is induced
by lifestyle rather than by academic considerations, and if increasing numbers of
such students strongly disrupt the education process. Conversely, if crowding costs
are moderate and the wage premium for mobile graduates is high, a segregated uni-
versity system appears to be best. If mobile students are motivated by academic
ambition, and can expect a high return to a good education, then it may well be
worthwhile, from a federation-wide point of view, to establish a very small number
of high-quality (“excellent”) universities in just a few states. All mobile students
(the “elite”), will attend these universities, whereas the rest receive an education at
their local university which is tailored to their moderate abilities.
This result obtains from the trade-off between crowding costs on the one hand,
and the benefit from concentrating students on the other hand. High crowding
costs suggest that one should avoid packing too many students in one university,
and hence call for an even distribution of students across states. The benefit from
concentrating students arises from a scale effect and from a specialisation effect. The
larger the number of students enrolled in one university, the larger is the aggregate
benefit derived from a given quality. Moreover, segregating all mobile students in
one university allows to tailor the quality of education more closely to the specific
demand of the two different groups of students. In the example, the higher the
wage for mobile students, the more important it is to take advantage from scale
and specialisation benefits. Thus, the benefit from concentration rises in the wage
premium for mobile graduates.
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D. Decentralised decisions
I. Tiebout equilibrium
In this section, decentralised choices of higher education policies are examined and
compared to the efficient allocation described in subsection C.I. Each state j =
1, ..., J chooses the quality qj of its universities, the number mj of mobile students
to be admitted, and a tuition fee tj charged to each student.
All mobile students are alike, and they can move without costs. Therefore, in an
equilibrium, all of them must obtain the same utility level. Denoting this utility
level by um, the fact that pursuing higher education is voluntary implies um ≥
uo. Moreover, universities in state j will only attract mobile students if the wage
obtained after graduating from j’s university, net of tuition, is at least as large as the
utility obtainable otherwise. Thus, in order to be able to enrol a positive number
mj > 0 of mobile students, state j’s quality and tuition policies have to satisfy
wm(qj)− tj ≥ um.
State governments pursue the interest of their native population. This encompasses
the wages of immobile students, `jw`(qj), net of tuition expenses paid by them, `jtj.
Moreover, the state government represents the interests of immobile parents who
bear the net fiscal burden induced by the university. This burden consists of the
difference between tuition revenues from immobile and mobile students (`j +mj)tj
and the operating costs of the university, cj(qj, `j + mj). In the present analysis,
states are considered to behave competitively, in the sense that a single state does
not feel itself to be large enough to affect, by its decisions, the equilibrium utility
um of mobile students. This implies that the government of any state j, although it
might be caring also for the mobile students originating from j, cannot affect, and
hence does not have to take into account, the well-being of those students.
Aggregating the payoffs of the immobile students and the parents of state j, and
observing that the tuition paid by immobile students cancels out, one obtains the
maximisation problem of state j
max
qj ,tj ,mj
Wj(qj, tj,mj) = `jw`(qj) +mjtj − cj(qj, `j +mj) (13)
s.t. [wm(qj)− tj − um]mj ≥ 0 , (14)
mj ≥ 0 . (15)
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Here, condition (15) rules out negative numbers of mobile students, and constraint
(14) ensures that mobile students are willing to apply to the university in j if a
positive number mj > 0 is to be admitted.
An equilibrium consists of a vector of qualities, tuition fees, and admission policies
for all states, (qj, tj,mj)
J
j=1, and a utility level um ≥ uo for mobile students such
that (qj, tj,mj) solves state j’s maximization problem (13) to (15), and such that
in aggregate, states do not admit more than the total number of students, M −∑J
j=1mj ≥ 0. In addition, optimality of the mobile students’ decision requires∑J
j=1mj =M if um > uo and um = uo if
∑J
j=1mj < M . Thus, if higher education is
worthwhile for a student, every student is admitted at some university. Conversely,
if there are students who choose not to pursue university education, the utility of
mobile graduates is driven down to the utility level of non-graduates.
In order to solve the maximisation problem (13) to (15), the Lagrange multipliers
µj and αj are associated to the constraints (14) and (15) respectively. Then, the
necessary conditions for an optimum are
∂L
∂qj
= `jw
′
`(qj)− cjq(qj, `j +mj) + µjmjw′m(qj) = 0 , (16)
∂L
∂tj
= mj − µjmj = 0 , (17)
∂L
∂mj
= tj − cjm(qj, `j +mj) + µj[wm(qj)− tj − um] + αj = 0 , (18)
together with the complementary slackness conditions corresponding to the con-
straints (14) and (15).
Considering first the case where the state wants to admit mobile students, mj > 0,
one observes from (17) that µj = 1. Inserting in (16) leads to the efficiency condition
(6). Thus, conditional on the number of mobile students, a state chooses the efficient
quality. Moreover, from complementary slackness andmj > 0, µj > 0, it follows that
wm(qj)− tj = um . (19)
Thus, a state which admits mobile students to its universities will raise tuition so
high that the package composed of quality and tuition is just attractive enough to
get applications. Moreover, with mj > 0, one must also have αj = 0. Using this
together with (19) in (18), one obtains
tj = c
j
m(qj, `j +mj) . (20)
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An additional student is thus charged the marginal crowding cost he inflicts on the
provider. Combining (20) with (19), one finally arrives at
wm(qj)− cjm(qj, `j) = um . (21)
Thus, in an equilibrium, the net social benefit of educating an additional student in
state j is equal to the utility this student obtains elsewhere.
In the case mj = 0, condition (16) again reduces to the efficiency condition (6), with
only local students determining the quality in this case. Moreover, since anyway,
no mobile student is admitted, the choice of the tuition level is not determined in
an optimum. Consequently, also in this case, the tuition level can be set equal to
marginal crowding costs, tj = c
j
m(qj, `j), without reducing the value of the objective
function. Moreover, as seen from (17), also the value of the Lagrange variable µj is
not determined if mj = 0. Choosing a positive value µj > 0, (18) then reduces to
wm(qj)− cjm(qj, `j)− um = −
αj
µj
≤ 0 (22)
with a strict inequality except for the limiting case where the non-negativity con-
straint (15) is just not binding. Therefore, if mj = 0 is optimal, the net social
benefit of admitting a student to the university in state j must be less than the util-
ity achievable for mobile students at other places or without university education.
To show that an efficient allocation can be supported as a Tiebout equilibrium, it
remains to show that there is a utility level um obtained by mobile students in the
equilibrium such that the conditions (21) and (22) determining decentrally optimal
enrolment coincide with the corresponding conditions for the welfare maximising
assignment of students to universities, (7) and (8). This is achieved with um = λ+uo.
That is, the equilibrium utility level um is chosen to be equal to the sum of the
value of education in the efficient allocation, λ, plus the utility uo obtained by a
mobile student if she foregoes higher education. With this equilibrium utility level,
the efficient choices are also optimal for the states. Finally, the solution to the
welfare maximisation problem implies that all mobile students are enrolled at some
university if λ = um − uo > 0. Conversely, if it is efficient to leave some mobile
students without higher education, then λ = um − uo = 0.
To summarise, the analysis in this subsection has shown that there is no market
failure intrinsic to a decentralised provision of higher education. This is true in
spite of the fact that state governments do not care about the utility of immigrating
students who take advantage of the quality of education provided by local taxpayers.
The main institutional requirement for this result to obtain is that states are free
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to choose a tuition level which adequately reflects the cost of providing university
education. In the following, it is examined how the equilibrium is affected if this
requirement is not met.
II. Federal regulation
In order to account for this kind of institutional restriction, in the present subsec-
tion, the central government fixes tuition levels at some arbitrary values tj for all
states j = 1, 2, ..., J , which the states are not allowed to exceed nor undercut. The
federally mandated tuition levels need not be uniform across states. For example,
it is conceivable that federal policy makers, for equity reasons, wish to impose lower
tuition fees in East Germany. Moreover, no specific level of the values tj is assumed,
although the politically relevant case clearly is given by a tuition cap which, for
social policy reasons, is rather low.
With predetermined tuition level tj, state j only decides on quality and enrolment.
Thus, its decision problem (13) to (15) changes to
max
qj ,mj
Wj(qj, tj,mj) = `jw`(qj) +mjtj − cj(qj, `j +mj) (23)
s.t. [wm(qj)− tj − um]mj ≥ 0 , (24)
mj ≥ 0 . (25)
The necessary conditions for an optimum are
∂L
∂qj
= `jw
′
`(qj)− cjq(qj, `j +mj) + µjmjw′m(qj) = 0 , (26)
∂L
∂mj
= tj − cjm(qj, `j +mj) + µj[wm(qj)− tj − um] + αj = 0 , (27)
with the complementary slackness conditions on both restrictions.
Also with fixed tuition level, state j may optimally choose to admit mobile students
(mj > 0) or not (mj = 0). In a solution with mj > 0, one has αj = 0 and
µj [wm(qj)− tj − um] = 0. This implies with (27) that (20) holds for tj = tj. That is,
admission is chosen so that the predetermined tuition just covers marginal crowding
costs. Regarding the quality of the university in state j, two scenarios can emerge.
Firstly, like in the case with unconstrained tuition, it is possible that the migration
constraint (24) is binding so that (19) holds with tj = tj. In the case of a fixed
tuition, this equation alone determines the quality qj. That is, if the state cannot
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adjust the tuition level so as to extract the rent from mobile students, it will achieve
the same result by reducing the quality of the education. Consequently, the efficiency
condition (6) does not govern the quality choice anymore. Instead, equation (26)
gives the value of the Lagrange multiplier
µj =
cjq(qj, `j +mj)− `jw′`(qj)
mjw′m(qj)
, (28)
where qj is determined by (19) with tj = tj, and mj is then determined, using qj,
by (20). Since µj must not be negative, this solution arises if
cjq(qj, `j +mj)− `jw′`(qj) ≥ 0 . (29)
If the values qj,mj determined from (19) and (20) fail to satisfy (29), then the second
scenario applies, where a positive rent is left to the mobile students, wm(qj)−tj > um.
This requires µj = 0, and hence in this case, from (26), one derives
`jw
′
`(qj) = c
j
q(qj, `j +mj) (30)
for the quality qj. Just as in the efficiency condition (6), the state government takes
into account the impact of mobile students on the marginal cost of providing quality.
It disregards, however, the willingness to pay for quality by the mobile students.
Which one of these solutions arises depends on the level of the tuition tj. If tuition
is very low, a low quality qj will be sufficient to attract applications by mobile
students. Such a low quality, however, will be too low from the point of view of the
local students, i.e., (29) fails. Then, it is preferable for the state j to increase quality,
even if this leaves some rent to the mobile students. Conversely, if the tuition is
very high, a high quality will be needed to make mobile students ready to study in
state j. Then, (29) will hold, and the state, in order to attract lucrative immigrant
students, pays for a quality which exceeds the one which would be best for the local
students.
In both cases, with fixed tuition, the quality choice is distorted. Except for the
coincidental case where µj = 1, the condition (6) is violated. It should be noted
that this result is independent of the level of the federally imposed tuition tj. Even
if tj is rather high, the benefit of an increase in quality accruing to mobile students is
not valued correctly by the state government, since it is not allowed to adjust tuition
accordingly. Thus, in contrast to a common complaint issued by representatives of
universities, the distortion of quality is not exclusively due to insufficient funding.
Rather, it is the consequence of a mismatch in the assignment of decisions and
revenues across layers of the public sector.
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Turning now to the case where it is optimal for state j not to admit any mobile
students, mj = 0, then from (26), the locally optimal quality qj will be chosen
according to the efficiency condition (6) with mj = 0. Such a solution can arise if,
with this quality qj, either wm(qj) − tj − um ≤ 0, or tj − cjm(qj, `j) ≤ 0, or both.
If both of these inequalities hold, it follows wm(qj)− cjm(qj, `j) − um ≤ 0. Thus, in
this case, educating a mobile student in state j would provide a net social benefit
which falls short of the utility which this student can expect elsewhere, and would
therefore be socially wasteful. With an arbitrary tuition tj, it may also be that no
mobile students are enrolled at the university in state j although it would be efficient
to do so. This may occur if one has wm(qj)− tj − um < 0 and tj − cjm(qj, `j) ≥ 0 or
wm(qj)− tj − um ≥ 0 and tj − cjm(qj, `j) < 0. The first case corresponds to a tuition
level which is set too high. The state is willing to admit some mobile students,
but these do not apply because the education provided is not worth the tuition. In
the second case, which corresponds to a tuition cap which is set fairly low, mobile
students are happy to apply to the university in state j but admitting them does
not pay off for the state.
Collecting the arguments from the previous discussion, and focussing on the realistic
case of a low tuition level, it appears likely that in the nationwide equilibrium,
some mobile students are not admitted to any university, while others are. At the
same time, in order to satisfy the needs of the local students, states will provide a
quality which is better than the one necessary to attract mobile students. Thus,
some mobile students will have to part without education, and some will obtain an
education which provides them with a rent, making them strictly better off than
those who are rejected by all universities.
A federally mandated tuition level thus creates a fiscal externality which is not
present when states are allowed to choose tuition levels freely. This externality
works in two dimensions. With a fixed tuition, there is no flexible price signal
relating the benefit of mobile students to quality improvements performed by state
governments, and so quality is distorted. Moreover, if tuition is capped at a low level,
states are reluctant to admit mobile students because they are not compensated for
the crowding costs induced by increasing numbers of students. As a consequence, a
university landscape emerges which, at a certain level of abstraction, is reminiscent of
the German experience throughout the last three decades: The quality of education
is chosen rather low, without taking into account the benefit of mobile students;
there is a permanent shortage of university places; and student applications have to
be rationed.
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III. Alternative fiscal instruments
For the sake of analytical clarity, the formal model presented so far considers only
a restricted set of fiscal instruments, i.e., tuition fees and a lump sum tax on immo-
bile residents. In order to interpret the results in a policy-oriented discussion, the
present subsection enlarges the focus by taking other fiscal instruments into account.
Specifically, it will be discussed how taxes paid by graduates and inter-governmental
transfers might interfere with the efficiency result obtained in subsection I.
For the discussion of income taxes paid by graduates, it is worthwhile to distinguish
between taxation by the federation and by the states. A federal tax reduces the
net income of graduates. If tuition is not deductible from the tax base, such a
tax makes it less attractive to take up university education. In the same time, the
revenue collected at most partially12 accrues to the state government, and thus only
part of it can be used to improve the university provided by the state. As a result, a
federal income tax is likely to reduce the overall quality of higher education. While
this vertical fiscal externality is a matter of concern, it is somewhat peripheral to
the issue of inter-state migration which is at the heart of the present paper. The
reason is that a uniform federal tax will reduce incentives to study in all states in
a similar way.13 Thus, the federal tax will reduce human capital accumulation, but
will not strongly distort its inter-regional allocation.
Contrary to a federal tax, the revenues of a state income tax paid by graduates will
fully accrue to the states and thus can be used to finance universities. Moreover,
when the state has autonomy over the tax schedule, it can choose the tax rate so as
to reflect the marginal crowding costs of educating an additional student. Mobile
students will then choose the university which provides the highest income net of
taxes, rather than net of tuition fees. This shows that, in the structure described
by the model, a state income tax paid by graduates is equivalent to the tuition
fee. Implementing this tax in practice, however, could be difficult for at least two
reasons. Firstly, in order to provide the right incentives for students, the tax cannot
be designed as a general income tax, where only the level, but not the source of
income matters for the tax liability. Rather, the tax bill of a graduate would have
to exceed the one of a non-graduate with the same income by the marginal cost
of education. It is reasonable to expect that Germany’s constitutional court would
rule such a differentiation to be unconstitutional on the grounds that it violates
12In Germany, states obtain 42.5% of income tax revenues (Art. 106 Abs. 3 S. 2, Abs. 5 GG).
13Some second order effects may arise from a progressive tax schedule since students are dispro-
portionately discouraged from attending high quality universities.
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horizontal equity. Secondly, and more fundamentally, students would simply evade
the graduate tax by moving to a low-tax state after graduation.14 To overcome
this, states where graduates work would have to collect graduate taxes on behalf of
the states which have provided the education. Since no state has an incentive to
administer a tax whose revenues accrue to others, a federal clearing and enforcement
mechanism would be needed – a rather cumbersome and dispute-prone institution.
The upshot of this discussion is that, although equivalent in a narrow theoretical
setting, a graduate tax which is levied ex post is much more difficult to implement
than a tuition fee which is paid ex ante.
Instead of the individual student paying tuition, the government of her home state
could pay an equivalent amount to the state where the student takes up higher
education. Such a system has been suggested for Germany under the name of
“GefoS”15, and is used in Switzerland. It creates the right incentives for state
governments as long as they take into account the benefit accruing to emigrating
students. Students, however, would not care about the transfer paid by their home
state and thus would choose the best universities, regardless of the cost of education.
In order to avoid this, students themselves would have to bear differences in tuition
levels at the margin. A way to achieve this is offered by vouchers. According to this
idea, each high school graduate obtains a voucher representing a certain amount
of tuition fees, and is free to choose whether and where to study. Once a student
takes up higher education in another state than her home state, the home state
transfers the amount guaranteed by the voucher to the university where the student
is enrolled. If this is a high quality institution charging more than the voucher, the
student would have to top up the voucher. Conversely, a student who is satisfied
to attend a low quality university, or none at all, should be allowed to cash in
the difference between the voucher and the tuition charged. In essence, a voucher-
based intergovernmental transfer system is thus a lump sum subsidy paid to mobile
students by the taxpayers of the home state.
14This effect is at the heart of Wildasin’s (2000) inefficiency result. The analysis presented here
suggests that an autonomy to set tuition fees at the university level will restore efficiency even in
Wildasin’s context of mobile graduates. The proof of this claim is left for future work, or to the
reader.
15“Geld folgt Studierenden” (Money follows students), see CHE and Stifterverband (1998, 1999).
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E. Conclusion
In this paper, a standard Tiebout model has been applied to higher education.
It was shown that an efficient allocation can be decentralised to states competing
for mobile students, provided that the states have the right to choose tuition fees
according to crowding costs. When such fees are ruled out by federal legislation,
states are likely to run down the quality of universities and to provide too few places
for students.
From this result, one concludes that the abolition of the ban on tuition fees forced
by the constitutional court in its 2005 ruling is a step in the right direction. Specifi-
cally, tuition fees are an essential part of a decentralised system of providing higher
education, as we have it in Germany. In order to get an idea about the likely level of
the tuition fee required, a look at actual expenditures per student is worthwhile. A
first benchmark for such a figure is obtained by simply dividing total expenditures
for higher education by the number of students enrolled. For example, relating the
amount spent in 2005 by German higher education institutions in the fields of law,
business/economics, and the social sciences, to the number of students enrolled in
these fields during the winter term 2005/06, one arrives at expenditures per student
of € 2547.16 A much more sophisticated approach has been followed by Lu¨deke
and Beckmann (1998) who, in addition to current outlays, assess imputed rents for
university buildings and implicit pension liabilities for professors. These authors
estimate the annual cost of educating a student in the social sciences to be € 5581
in prices of 1994; for some other fields like theology and medical studies, they find
substantially higher costs.17 Their approach does not distinguish, however, between
average and marginal crowding costs. This is attempted in Kraus (2004). Using
data on current expenditures for the years 1996-1999 from all business/economics
departments in Germany, Kraus estimates the marginal cost of an additional student
in these fields, evaluated at the enrolment size which minimises cost per student,
at € 1799 p.a. Although the wide variation of these numbers obviously leaves a
lot of room for interpretation, it seems plausible that the maximal tuition fee of
€ 1000 currently levied falls short of the true marginal cost of educating an addi-
tional student. Thus, an increase seems warranted. Moreover, one would expect,
and welcome from a welfare-theoretic point of view, a stronger differentiation of fees
across universities and across fields of study, so as to reflect differences in quality
and production costs.
16Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt (2007a, Table 1.4; 2007b, Table ZUS-06), own calculations.
17Lu¨deke and Beckmann (1998, Table 1, p. 10).
21
As a more fundamental conclusion, the analysis presented here suggests that there
is nothing inherently wrong with decentralised policy in higher education. Follow-
ing Tiebout’s insight, an excludable good, which higher education certainly is, can
be provided by competing jurisdictions in an efficient way if users can be charged
accordingly. For a long time, the German system, until recently characterised by
federal regulation of state universities and a ban on tuition fees, did not nearly con-
form to this ideal. Rather, the current state of German universities may serve as an
example for the consequences of the general structural deficit of German federalism:
States are quite autonomous in their spending decisions, but do not have the right
to decide on their own revenues – be it tuition, in the case of universities, or taxes,
for all kinds of public goods provided by states. Since revenue-raising and spending
authority are out of line, states do not face the correct incentives, and hardly take
efficient decisions. Germany will have a long way to go so as to bridge this gap, but,
with recent reforms in higher education, at least has started on this journey.
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